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GENETIC MANIPULATION: RESEARCH REGULATION
AND LEGAL LIABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
While we people of the earth divide it up into separate
jurisdictional entities, the biosphere is unitary. If we are to
protect and save the biosphere from dangerous pollution, the
controls in large measure must be international.'
The urgent need for international cooperation in combatting
dangerous chemicals that adversely affect the environment cannot be
overemphasized. 2 Since the winds, the oceans and many rivers do not
honor national boundaries, international solidarity is indispensible for
effective pollution control. 3 Scientists are now privileged with the
ability to create dangerous germs using the recently developed tech-
1. Douglas, J., Pollution: An International Problem Needing International Solu-
tion, 7 TEXAS INT'L L.J. I (1971).
2. Adlai Stevenson graphically illustrated this position:
We travel together, passengers on a little spacecraft, dependent on its vulner-
able resources of air and soil; all committed for our safety to its security and
peace; preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work. . . the love we
give our fragile craft.
Quoted in Joyner & Joyner, Global Eco-Management and International Organizations:
The Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533
(1974).
3. For example, in recent years a dangerous "red snow" has fallen on parts of
Norway. Chemical analysis traced the iron particles to factory emissions in such distant
places as the Ruhr and the British Isles. Another example is Northwestern Europe, a
densely populated and developed area in need of common regulations and enforcement
procedures to control various forms of pollution, such as in the Rhine River. Many
scientists believe these countries should go as far as adopting a common strategy for the
use and development of their precious land. J. HUNTLY, MAN'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HUNTLY].
An example of coordinated pollution control efforts in North America is the struggle
of Canada and the United States to eliminate decay of the Great Lakes. The Lakes have
served both countries for aesthetic, recreational and economic purposes since the area
was first inhabited, yet such extensive deterioration has occurred that these natural
resources are decaying rapidly. To combat this devastation, Canada and the United States
entered into a mutual agreement in 1969, that advocates an effective, joint water pollution
control program to curtail the decline of these resources. The treaty provides for a
coordinating agency empowered to exercise supervision over activities affecting the
Lakes. See Boundary and Waters Agreement with Canada, July 24, 1969, [1969] 20 U.S.T.
2702, T.I.A.S. No. 6732. See also Comment, Pollution of the Great Lakes: A Joint
Approach by Canada and the United States, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 109 (1971).
Most international agreements pertaining to the environment relate to marine pollu-
tion. See I B. ROSTER & B. SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT-
TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1975).
1
Izenstark: Genetic Manipulation: Research Regulation and Legal Liability Und
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
nique of genetic manipulation. This discovery has made the need for a
unified international effort to protect the planet from pollution of the
biosphere4 more compelling than ever before. Yet, the rise of genetic
manipulation, the newest potential contributor to environmental pollu-
tion, has been marked by the absence of international standards and
enforcement procedures for regulating such research.
5
A hypothetical will serve to illustrate the gravity of the problem and
the need for immediate international action.6 Suppose that a scientist in a
technologically advanced nation were to isolate what he believed to be
the genetic information that causes normal cells to reproduce at an
accelerated rate, resulting in malignant tumor growth. If this scientist
should become careless, the isolated germ might escape the confines of
4. Biosphere is defined as that part of the universe in which living organisms are
known to exist. DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 202 (25th ed. 1974).
5. The critical need for international cooperation in designing regulations has
been echoed repeatedly in the past few months by noted authorities from diverse
disciplines. For example, Robert L. Sinsheimer of the California Institute of Technology
recently wrote:
[I]t will not be sufficient to apply. . . restrictions only to American research-
ers. An effort must be made to secure an international agreement guaranteeing
similar precautions wherever research into recombinant DNA is carried out.
Sinsheimer, Caution May Be an Essential Scientific Virtue, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 29,
1976, part IV, at 5, col. 3.
6. Although this scenario is couched in hypothetical terms, actual incidents of germ
pollution have occurred domestically. Perhaps the best known was the escape of a
smallpox germ from an experimental laboratory in England, resulting in the death of a
young woman. NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 1973, at 78. Other incidents include children playing
with discarded laboratory containers and contaminated syringes improperly disposed by
an English pharmaceutical firm; a culture of meningitis stolen from an Australian research
laboratory; a dangerous bacterium accidentally ingested by a researcher when his pipette
was withdrawn from a culture; and three fatalities in the United States caused by the
laboratory escape of infectious choriomeningitis (meningitis affecting the brain). Ford,
Call for Biohazard Legislation, 250 NATURE 364 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ford].
However, the recent tragedy in Hopewell, Virginia, best illustrates the immediate
need for regulations and enforcement when working with dangerous chemicals. Employ-
ees of the Life Sciences Products Co. pesticide plant, and their families have been
threatened with damage to internal organs, blindness, sensitivity to noise, and sterility,
because warnings by the United States Food and Drug Administration were unheeded by
plant officials. Unaware that "kepone," the plant's sole product, can be absorbed through
the skin, employees did not wear rubber gloves or comply with sanitary precautions.
Moreover, for sixteen months before the plant was closed, toxic wastes were channelled
through the Hopewell sewage treatment system and into the James River, one of the area's
sources of fish and shellfish. TIME, Feb. 2, 1976, at 42. See also U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Sept. 6, 1976, at 43.
The culmination of the kepone tragedy occured on October 5, 1976, when a federal
district court levied $3.7 million on the now defunct Life Sciences Products Co. for kepone
pollution. Allied Chemical Corporation, which had contracted with Life Sciences to
produce the deadly chemical, was also reprimanded with a maximum fine of $13,375,000
for polluting the James River. See San Diego Union, Oct. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
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the laboratory. A common abuse of laboratory procedure would permit
the minute particle to be flushed down a laboratory sink before its
reproductive process was disarmed. Since the sewer systems very
probably would harbor close relatives of the escaped germ, the propaga-
tion of deadly organisms would be expedited, resulting in instant
contamination of the waterways. 7 At this point, the problem no longer
would be domestic since the germ would have the ability to infect the
resources of neighboring countries. 8 Once unleashed into the waterways
or atmosphere, the irrevocable path of a self-procreating germ would be
devastating and unlimited. Moreover, modern means of transportation
would facilitate contamination via human carriers.
The incidence of laboratory-produced infections, 5000 cases in the
past thirty years, suggests that the eventual escape of such an organism
can be expected. 9 Fear of such a disaster prompted a committee of
renowned scientists to call for a voluntary halt to research into some
potentially dangerous areas of genetics. 10 This pause was called because
of new genetic transplantation techniques which could create dangerous
microorganisms completely immune to antibodies. " Since international
regulations for the control of such techniques are lacking, it would be
possible for mishandled microorganisms to escape from a laboratory
and infect countless people in all nations with illnesses the medical
profession is unable to cure. 
12
The novel and experimental aspects of man's activities in genetic
research, as well as the nationalistic competition for achievement of
medical cures and the necessity of utilizing dangerous organisms to
achieve these ends, make many types of accidents conceivable, if not
7. Sewerage systems contain bacterial wastes from man and animals, including the
bacterium Escherichia coli (E. coli); see text accompanying notes 18-19, infra.
8. See generally Ford, supra note 6, at 364-65.
9. Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium, 187 SCIENCE
931 (1975).
10. Genetics is the study of heredity and can be divided into three categories:
biochemical genetics (the science concerned with the chemical and physical nature of
genes); clinical genetics (the study of genetic factors which result in a diseased condition);
and molecular genetics (the branch of genetics concerned with structure and activities of
genetic material). The basis for the research referred to in this comment lies in the third
subdivision. An excellent explanation of the field can be found in J. WATSON, MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (1970).
11. See ScI. DIG., July, 1975, at 71.
12. An eminent author expresses the urgent need for caution in this area, and asks
scientists to use hindsight as a guide:
It is precisely because we cannot see, in detail, the consequences of using the
new biological powers that they constitute dangers. The fact that they might be
used for benign purposes. . . is not the point, for history shows us that man is
far more likely to use power wrongly than rightly.
G. TAYLOR, BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 223 (1968).
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probable. To date, no formal international claims based on damages and
injuries resulting from genetic research have been presented, but the
possibility of damage from such a disaster cannot be eliminated.
However, this possibility can be reduced if international regulations are
imposed on every country engaged in such research. 3
The purpose of this comment is to suggest steps to further interna-
tional cooperation in genetic manipulation. 14 The proposed vehicle for
international cooperation is a convention consisting of three major
components. 5 First, international research regulations must be adopted
by all nations studying genetic manipulation. Second, a corresponding
enforcement mechanism in the form of a board of inquiry will ensure
compliance with the international regulations. Third, if enforcement
fails and a deadly germ escapes, a procedure must exist to resolve any
damage claims arising from this potentially devastating incident. An
arbitral tribunal is proposed as the method for resolution of any such
damage claims.
I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Genetic manipulation involves the joining of basic hereditary
material, genes, into biologically functional combinations that do not
occur in nature. Genes are comprised of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
molecules. 6 Ordinarily, hereditary characteristics of greatly differing
13. Former President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the National Academy of
Sciences, made the following observations to a professional audience:
Every time you scientists make a major invention, we politicians have to invent
a new institution to cope with it, and almost invariably these days, and happily,
it must be an international institution.
49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 778, 779 (1963).
14. This comment discusses only "pure" scientific research as distinguished from
military or commercial applications of technology. Moreover, questions of liability under
municipal law for damages incurred by nationals of the state to which liability is assigned
internationally are outside the scope of this comment. Also, damage inflicted intentionally
as an act of war is a subject matter more appropriate to a discussion of the maintenance of
international order than of scientific research.
15. "A convention is an agreement usually relating to some specific subject rather
than to matters of general character as in the case of a treaty." G. WILSON, HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (3d ed. 1939).
The challenge posed by this comment calls for a far greater marshalling of intellectual
resources than has been attempted to date.
It is not enough to leave this to the scientists themselves. Scientific bodies, like
others, tend to become narrow and exclusive. They often look inward to their
own techniques and doctrine and are inclined to look down on outsiders or those
with unorthodox ideas. . . . Political experts, economists, lawyers, sociolo-
gists and others as well, are needed to deal with the varied policy implications of
research.
Schachter, Scientific Advances and International Law Making, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 423,428
(1967).
16. Genetic research is noteworthy for its rapid progress. The basic composition of
the gene, DNA, was discovered by Friedrich Miescher only one hundred years ago. In
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organisms do not join together because of natural barriers to such
unions.17 However, recent research has enabled scientists to transcend
these species barriers by introducing hereditary characteristics from any
kind of plant or animal cell into bacteria. This is achieved by attaching a
fragment of plant or animal DNA to a "vehicle," such as a virus,
capable of self-reproduction in bacteria, then inserting this hybrid into
bacterial cells, 18 for example, Escherichia coli (E. coli). E. coli is the
current organism of choice, since more is known about its behavior than
any other bacterium. 9 The characteristics of the resulting artificial
bacteria are not at all predictable, and there is widespread fear that germs
created in this way would be hostile to natural biospheric life.20
1953, Watson and Crick delineated the DNA molecular structure, discovering that all life
forms were determined by this double-helical molecule. Recently at M.I.T., scientists
have "assembled, entirely from off-the-shelf chemicals, a synthetic gene that [performs]
its hereditary function perfectly when inserted into a living bacterium." NEWSWEEK, Sept.
13, 1976, at 72. See generally J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968).
17. Hearings on Genetic Engineering, Examination of the Relationship of a Free
Society and its Scientific Community, 1975, Before the Subcommittee on Health of the
Committee of Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. at 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
18. Genes consist of double-coiled molecules of DNA. Most genes are grouped
together in large chains known as chromosomes. A few, however, are combined in small
rings known as plasmids. Genetic manipulation involves removing plasmids from their
host bacteria, splitting them open chemically, and inserting new genes into them. The
altered plasmids then can be introduced into other bacteria where the genes start to change
the hereditary characteristics of their new host bacteria. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1976, at 50
[hereinafter cited as NEWSWEEK]. The following diagram illustrates this genetic manipula-
tion process.
1. 2. 3. 4.
DNA DNA DNA ring split Genetically altered DNA
ring ring chemically for ring reintroduced into
in separated admission of another bacterium
bacterium from new gene
bacterium
19. Although this represents a majority view, Dr. Richard Goldstein of Harvard
Medical School has written a radical critique opposing the use of E. coli. He states that
using E. coli as a host organism is unsafe "in any size, shape, or form." Goldstein argues
that E. coli, which is easily airborne and lodges in the throat, is a "reckless" choice and
"ecologically unsuitable" as a host in DNA experiments. Recombinant DNA: NIHGroup
Stirs Storm by Drafting Laxer Rules, 190 SCIENCE 767, 768-69 (1975).
20. "The possible results: The spread of infectious disease; the proliferation of
5
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However, acute toxicity is not the primary danger. Chemical toxins are
static by nature, their effect dissipating as a function of their dispersion
through time and space. The core of the recombinant problem is that
artificial bacteria, whatever their attributes, will be self-replicating,
exactly like natural bacteria. Germs are dynamic entities, whose con-
centration is determined by factors independent of the extent of their
dispersion. This means that if an extremely dangerous germ were
developed in a laboratory, the escape of a single bacterium would be
sufficient to effect the widest possible spread of infection.
21
The concern about potential biohazards22 to human health and the
environment, centers on the abundance of many bacteria, such as E.
coli, in the human intestine and nasal passages. This profusion in the
body significantly increases the possibility of an irreversible experimen-
tal disaster since a genetically altered E. coli would have no difficulty
finding human carriers once it escaped its laboratory chamber. 23 The
time required for such contamination cannot be determined, but it can be
predicted that if a germ escaped from the laboratory, infection would be
virtually instantaneous. The abundance of possible carriers, the inherent
ability of experimental germs to reproduce, and the lack of natural
defenses to artificial bacteria support this conclusion. Moreover, since
the characteristics of artificial bacteria cannot be predicted with any
precision, the possibility of an artificial "antidote" existing at the
moment of the new germ's creation seems vanishingly small.
Despite these grave dangers, the advantages of genetic manipula-
tion research may provide society with innumerable benefits. 24 The
manufacture of insulin, antibiotics, and other pharmaceutical products
using genetic manipulation procedures is quite probable.2 5 Such
achievements could greatly increase available quantities of essential but
cancer-causing organisms; the dissemination of toxic agents; or dangerously increased
resistance to antibiotics." Sci. DIG., July, 1975, at 71.
21. Human beings have once again happened upon the ability to threaten
themselves with a blight which might someday prove to be the biological
equivalent of nuclear radiation leakage.
But gamma rays, of course, cannot reproduce.
ROLLING STONE, June 19, 1975, at 38. "But a laboratory mutant might cause a plague of
infectious disease resistant to available antibiotics. Altered DNA can be dynamite." TIME,
July 29, 1974, at 59.
22. The term "biohazard" refers to the risks incurred by the culture of harmful
organisms. Ford, No Legal Control of Biological Hazards, 121 NEW L.J. 823 (1971).
23. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 7, 1975, at 66 [hereinafter cited as U.S.
NEWS].
24. The most recent discovery includes the construction of a bacterium that can
digest oil spilled on waterways at a rate several times faster than other oil-consuming
bacteria. See 150 J. NAT'L GEOG. Soc. 355,374(1976) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L GEOG.].
25. Luria, Modern Biology: A Terrifying Power, 209 THE NATION 406 (1969).
Vol. 7
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1977], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss1/4
GENETIC MANIPULATION
presently rare substances, with a concurrent reduction in health care
costs. 26 Genetic manipulation also promises advances in medical
research. If geneticists can observe the bacterial replication process in
microscopic detail, a clue to the mysterious multiplication of cancerous
cells will be uncovered. 27 Additionally, the physician's knowledge of
genetically based illnesses such as schizophrenia and diabetes can be
greatly expanded by using advanced genetic manipulation procedures. 28
Genetically hybrid crops, engineered specifically for disease resistance
and enormous nutritional yield, are also on the scientific horizon. 29 If
crops could be given the genetic ability to convert nitrogen from the air
into needed chemicals for growth, dependence on expensive fertilizers
would be dramatically reduced.3"
From these anticipated advantages, one can easily appreciate the
need to continue genetic manipulation research. Since scientific inquiry
is advantageous and cannot be stifled, the best alternative would be to
work within a well-defined system of controls. 3 If the recently formu-
lated guidelines described below are adopted and followed by involved
nations, genetic research will be able to proceed without serious
impediment, and yet will be sufficiently controlled so that the ocur-
rence of an experimental disaster will become a fear of the past.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA
MOLECULES: A NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
In response to the immediate need for international regulations,
eleven leading molecular biologists published an open letter in July,
26. San Diego Union, Dec. 7, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 2.
27. Many scientists suspect that at least some forms of cancer originate from
viral genetic material that every person carries from the moment of birth.
Through most of life, the body suppresses or ignores these tumor-building
instructions. But in time, somehow, the body's genetic machinery picks up
these codes and acts upon them. Science would like to know more about how
these viruses eventually slip their codes into otherwise normal cells and become
expressed.
L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1975, part II, at I, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as L.A. Times].
28. NEWSWEEK, supra, note 18.
29. NAT'L GEOG., supra note 24, at 391. Already, relatively disease-resistant and
hardy enough to thrive in unfavorable soils and climates, "triticale," the world's first
man-made crop, is being grown experimentally on five continents. By overcoming a
sterility barrier between two important grains, scientists can now combine the high-yield
and protein content of wheat with the ruggedness of rye. This breakthrough has the
potentials for increasing world food supplies and alleviating calorie and protein malnutri-
tion. See Friggens, Triticale: World's First Man-Made Crop, AMERICAN AGRICULTURIST
AND THE RURAL NEW YORKER, Nov., 1975, at 20.
30. NEWSWEEK, supra, note 18.
31. In fact, to prohibit research would possibly result in greater damage than
allowing it to continue. "No scientist in his right mind would ever think this type of
research could be stopped; knowledge, once it escapes, multiplies as fast as bacteria."
THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1974, at 78.
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1974, which appeared in the American journal Science32 and the British
journal Nature.33 The letter asked for the voluntary, worldwide suspen-
sion of all work in genetic manipulation research until an international
meeting could be convened to assess the potential hazards of such
experiments.3 4 As far as is known, the suspension of research was
observed internationally by all scientists.
35
A. Asilomar Guidelines
The meeting, the International Conference on Recombinant DNA
Molecules, took place from February 24, to February 27, 1975, at the
Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific Grove, California.36 The Con-
ference represented a landmark step for science and mankind, unique in
establishing safety precautions to be observed in a field of scientific
development before, instead of after, the first occurrence of a threatened
hazard. 37 Seventeen countries were represented, allowing some of the
foremost authorities in the world to deliberate the issues.
38
The meeting was organized to review scientific progress in genetic
manipulation and to discuss appropriate means of handling potential
biohazards of this work. The review of progress addressed the same
dangers which had prompted the moratorium proposed by the July
letter. It was agreed that the moratorium would be superceded by the
stipulation that no scientific research be undertaken which would
involve more than minimal risk to researchers, the public at large, and to
the animal and plant species sharing the world ecosystems.
39
32. 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974).
33. 250 NATURE 175 (1974). See also Davis, Genetic Engineering: How Great Is the
Danger?, 186 SCIENCE 309 (1974), which succinctly states the scientist's duty toward
society:
[S]cientists [must] help the public. . . sort out these complex issues and avoid
anxiety over improbable or distant developments. . . . Such anxiety could lead
to pruning of valuable major limbs on the tree of knowledge, rather than of
branches with dangerous fruit.
Id. at 309.
34. Davis, supra note 33.
35. U.S. NEWS, supra note 23.
36. Weinberg, Asilomar Decision: Unprecedented Guidelines for Gene-Transplant
Research, Sci. NEWS, March 8, 1975, at 148.
37. SCIENCE, supra note 9.
38. One hundred and fifty-five participants attended the meeting. Eighty-three were
from United States research, governmental, and industrial institutions, fifty-one were
from comparable organizations outside the United States, and twenty-one represented the
scientific news media. For a list of the conferees and their affiliations see Report of the
Organizing Committee of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules,
Appendix A (on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.).
39. Berg, Baltimore, Brenner, Roblin and Singer, Summary Statement of the
Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA
1981 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Berg].
Vol. 7
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In order to guarantee that the risk would be held to an acceptably
low level, the delegates agreed upon three practical principles.
a
First, the work on the construction of DNA molecules should proceed,
provided that appropriate safeguards are used. 4 Second, the standards
of protection should be more demanding now while genetic manipula-
tion research is in its infancy, and modified as improvements in the
methodology occur.4 2 Third, if an experiment is of such a dangerous
nature that it cannot be accomplished safely with presently available
containment facilities, it should not be attempted.43
To control the risks inherent in experimentation, the Conference
members divided the current research on genetic manipulation into
minimal, low, moderate, and high-risk categories, with corresponding
containment procedures." Specific experiments that would fall under
each designation were not listed, but were left to the individual scien-
tist's judgment.45
Generally, the minimal risk category includes biohazards that can
be accurately assessed and which pose minimal dangers to the environ-
40. The rationale guiding those three principles was based on the premise that
although assessments of the risks involved with each of the various lines of research may
differ, all of the conference delegates believed that the methodology employed did involve
severe dangers which had to be minimized. Id.
41. The establishment of an "appropriate safeguard" for a given experiment may be
achieved in several ways. A primary method of limiting the spread of dangerous germs is
the use of biological barriers. These barriers utilize bacterial organisms that are paralyzed
in natural environments (for example, outside the laboratory) or that are non-transmissible
and able to grow only in specialized cultures. Physical barriers supplement these
safeguards by providing strict adherence to correct microbiological practices. This
necessitates education and training of all personnel involved with hazardous DNA
experiments. Id. at 1982.
42. When additional research generates new knowledge of DNA activities, perhaps
the protective devices can become less stringent. One possible avenue is the development
of a special bacterium which would self-destruct if it managed to escape its artificial
laboratory conditions. See Weinberg, supra note 36, at 150. Notwithstanding such
developments, extreme caution and rigorous adherence to regulation should always be the
foundation upon which any new discovery is built.
43. Berg, supra note 39. Although the biological mechanisms involved in genetic
manipulation research are complex, actual experimentation is extremely simple. "[Tihe
technique requires a moderate degree of sophistication at present, [but] will be a 'high
school project within a few years.' "Wade, Genetic Manipulation: Temporary Embargo
Proposed on Research, 185 SCIENCE 332 (1974).
44. Berg, supra note 39, at 1982.
45. Since no risk classification of experiments and no set of containment procedures
can anticipate all situations, the parameters proposed at Asilomar were broadly conceived
with the intent to provide provisional guidelines for investigators. However, each scientist
bears a responsibility for determining whether in his or her particular case, special
circumstances warrant a higher level of containment than was suggested at the Confer-
ence. Berg, supra note 39, at 1983-84.
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ment. 46 Containment can be achieved by observing common safety
measures. These might include merely the prohibition of eating, drink-
ing, or smoking in the laboratory.4 7 At the high-risk end of the spectrum,
however, experimentation could proceed only in very elaborate, high-
containment facilities.48 High-risk experiments would be those employ-
ing cancer-producing viruses, or those involving the insertion of lethal
toxins into widely occurring bacteria. Such experiments carry a signifi-
cant risk of ecological disruption or pathogenicity of modified
organisms.
49
All scientists were urged to follow these guidelines until national
bodies formulated their own research standards.
50
46. An analogy to the fatal diseases of yesterday may prove helpful here. Thirty
years ago, smallpox and tuberculosis presented mysterious transmittal powers to physi-
cians and scientists. With continuing research and immunological vaccines, however,
these diseases became controllable, resulting in a drastic decrease in their occurrence.
Today, these once-threatening disorders pose little danger to mankind. The same reason-
ing may be applied to genetic research. When organisms are used with little potential for
harm, less stringent methodological regulation is required than when unknown and
unpredictable organisms are loose in the experimental playground.
Yet, self-confidence in one's work must always be tempered with reality. For
example, three years ago, in a laboratory in Cambridge, England, a serious protest among
technicians and younger scientists arose when they discovered that a room in their
building was currently used for attempts to infect human cells, cultured loose in glass
dishes, with a virus that causes leukemia in cats. The protesting scientists threatened to
call a strike unless much more thorough protective apparatus were installed. Judson,
Fearful of Science-Who Shall Watch the Scientists?, 250 HARPER 70 (1975).
47. The primary danger presented by the consumption of food or drink in the
laboratory is the possibility that a dangerous germ could be ingested into the body, causing
unknown side effects. By the same token, contamination of pure organisms by food
products may occur if experimenters become careless, resulting in a loss of time and funds
in preparing a new virgin strain.
Smoking is not permitted in any experimental laboratory for the obvious reason of
protecting against combustion since flammable materials are normally present in the
experimental environment.
48. High-risk containment includes such stringent regulations as air locks, negative
pressure, clothing changes, and showers. The cost of building such a facility might
discourage many researchers from proposing any experiment requiring this grade of
safety. See L.A. Times, supra note 27. Yet, even seemingly impenetrable containment
mechanisms are not completely immune to failure. Recently, an English researcher was
manipulating a mysterious virus, enclosed in an isolation chamber, by means of plastic
gloves. When the researcher developed unique medical symptoms, it was discovered that
a slit in the glove material permitted the loosely cultured virus to attack the researcher's
bare skin. Isolation and quarantine are the only known defenses to this deadly and highly
contagious new virus which appeared without explanation in Central Africa in June, 1976.
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1976, at 55.
49. Weinberg, supra note 36; Berg, supra note 39, at 1982.
50. Until an international code of conduct is established, individual scientists should
use the proposal adopted at Asilomar as a research guide. Recommendations which can be
implemented immediately and directly by the scientific community include the develop-
ment of safer test organisms, health surveillance of all personnel, and education and
Vol. 7
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The Asilomar Conference publicly revealed the profound need for
genetic manipulation regulation. 5 1 In June, 1976, the United States
responded to this need by issuing through the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), formal guidelines based on Asilomar precedent, for
genetic manipulation research conducted by governmental agencies. 52
The NIH guidelines are complex and lengthy, yet flexible, and provide a
regulatory milestone in research of this kind. 53 However, it is urged that
all nations, including the United States, meet the need for a pervasive
regulatory scheme with nothing short of the formation of an interna-
tional agreement that specifically states the regulations to be followed
when genetic manipulation is attempted.
54
reassessment of experimenters achieved through annual workshops and international
meetings. See also Part IV, Recommendations for the Implementation of Guidelines,
presented at Asilomar Conference (on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.) [hereinafter cited as
Recommendations].
51. The Conference did propose international cooperation in regulating research,
but not to the extent needed for full control of biohazard containment or to the extent
proposed in this comment.
Hopefully, through both formal and informal channels of information within
and between the nations of the world, the way in which potential biohazards and
levels of containment are matched [will] be consistent.
Berg, supra note 39.
52. 41 FED. REG. 27902 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NIH guidelines].
53. See Rules for Gene Research, So. NEWS, July 3, 1976, at 3; NEWSWEEK, July 4,
1976, at 106.
54. Numerous nations have initiated regulatory measures, demonstrating the
worldwide concern and desire for biohazard containment. For example, the European
Molecular Biology Organization has established a standing Advisory Committee on
Recombinant DNA which met on Feb. 14, and 15, 1976, to discuss the NIH guidelines and
their suitability for implementation in Europe. While European countries might accept the
general principles embodied in the guidelines, certain procedures may not lend themselves
to easy adaptation because Europe does not have an organization equivalent to the
National Institutes of Health. It therefore is not clear who could assume the responsibil-
ity of certifying biologically disarmed microorganisms. Letter to the author from Dr. John
Tooze, EMBO Executive Secretary, Jan. 19, 1976 [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
Substantial progress in research regulation has also been achieved in individual
countries. In Australia, there is no formal government policy in the genetic manipulation
area nor is there likely to be. The number of Australian scientists likely to do work in this
field is extremely limited. However, the Australian Academy of Science has convened a
Standing Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules. A report prepared by the commit-
tee sets up five "risk" categories and prescribes "containment measures" similar to those
proposed at Asilomar to be followed for each category. The highest risk category includes
"[tiechnically feasible experiments which present such serious dangers that their per-
formance should not be undertaken at this time with currently available vector-host
systems and presently available containment capability." NIH, Foreign Government
Constraints on Scientists Conducting Research on DNAIRNA Recombinants 1, 1976
(working paper distributed to those in attendance at a special meeting of the Advisory
Committee to the Director of NIH, held in Bethesda, Md., Feb. 9-10, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as NIH working paper] [on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.]. "The Standing Committee
of the Academy requests scientists working on or proposing work in this area to study
guidelines and then fill in a questionnaire. The committee will assess the degree of hazard
11
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B. International Regulations
It is proposed that the best vehicle for international regulation
would be a convention, sponsored by the World Health Organization
in submitted proposals and will recommend appropriate containment procedures." Id. at
2.
Canada has no formal federal government constraints on investigators conducting
research on DNA molecules. Thus, the only guidelines followed are those implicit in
normal biomedical research similar to procedures in effect in the United States. There is
no formal enforcement of restrictions at the provincial level. However, a committee of the
federal government's Medical Research Council is drafting regulations on DNA research,
which will apply to all research funded in part by the government. This approach is similar
to recent NIH guidelines on genetic research (see text accompanying notes 60-63, infra).
NIH working paper, supra at 2.
In England, a working party under the chairmanship of Lord Ashby submitted a
report to the British Parliament which contained a "very thoughtful analysis of the
potential benefits and hazards attendant upon gene grafting research and outline[d] very
briefly a set of broad recommendations." Proposed Guidelines on Potential Biohazards
Associated with Experiments Involving Genetically Altered Microorganisms 4, presented
at Asilomar Conference [on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
The French government is concerned about the problems of research regulation and
plans to establish a review committee to monitor research in this field. When guidelines are
completed they will be distributed by the French government. NIH working paper, supra
at 2.
A joint committee on "Safety of New Gene Combinations" was established in the
Federal Republic of Germany in March, 1975, by the German Research Society. The
committee is comprised of members from the federal government, the Research Society,
and German scientists, and its purpose is to establish guidelines for scientists in the field of
DNA experiments. It is expected that the scientific recommendations will relate closely to
the guidelines established at the Asilomar Conference which are presently considered as
binding in the Federal Republic. NIH working paper, supra at 2-3.
The Italian Society of Biophysics and Molecular Biology was organized recently to
study the scientific and practical implications of gene manipulations. Any legislative
action in Italy most likely will be guided by the recently prepared United States standards.
Letter to the author from Dr. Vittorio Sgaramella, Visiting Associate Professor at
Stanford University Medical Center, Jan. 5, 1976 [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
The Japan Science Council has formed a committee to discuss genetic manipulation
research guidelines. Several meetings and public hearings have been held so far, but no
conclusions have been reached. Letter to the author from Dr. Kenichi Matsubara,
Laboratory of Molecular Genetics, Univ. of Osaka Medical School, Nov. 13, 1975 [copy
on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
The control of research on DNA experimentation in the Netherlands has been studied
by the Royal Academy of Science Advisory Committee, appointed by the Science
Minister. Policies will be developed on such research, and an inventory of research
projects is currently underway. NIH working paper, supra at 3.
The Swedish Medical Research Council, in cooperation with other Swedish research
councils, recently established a genetic toxicity committee to study the research implica-
tions of DNA experiments. However, no committee meetings had been held as of
February, 1976. NIH working paper, supra at 4.
The Soviet Ministry of Health has reported that the U.S.S.R. has no restrictions on
either basic or applied research done in regard to DNA investigations. Nevertheless, such
research is conducted in many fields at different institutes. There are no limitations upon
this research at the national or republic levels. Moreover, Soviet authorities are not even
aware of any restrictions at the institute level. NIH working paper, supra at 4.
Vol. 7
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(WHO) under the auspices of the United Nations.55 In addition to setting
forth regulations, the Convention would also contain provisions for a
board of inquiry to curb potential regulation violators, and an arbitral
tribunal to decide actual damage controversies when they arise.
Sponsorship of a convention by WHO would be a natural extension
of its current activities regarding genetic research. In August, 1975, the
WHO Advisory Committee on Medical Research,56 after carefully
55. For the past decade, the United Nations has been concerned with environmental
pollution problems. This is evidenced by the following resolutions: G.A. Res. 2581, 24
U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) strongly supported the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment and provided that the primary purpose of
the conference should be to encourage and establish guidelines for action by national
governments; G.A. Res. 2849, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 70, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971)
stated that the international community and organizations of the United Nations should
strengthen international cooperation in environmental fields and should utilize natural
resources rationally; G.A. Res. 2850, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 72, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971) set out the drafts preparatory to the Conference on the Human Environment; G.A.
Res. 3003, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972) established an
international prize for the most outstanding contribution in the field of environmental
protection. See also Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-
Recommendations on Guiding Principles Concerning Environmental Policies, 66 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 837 (1972).
However, it was not until the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
that environmental protection received the recognition it deserved. From June 5, through
June 16, 1972, over 1200 delegates, representing one hundred and thirteen nations, met in
Stockholm to draft a blueprint for international progress and cooperation in managing the
environment. The result was the Declaration on the Human Environment. Within it is
found recognition and acceptance of an environmental ethic under which nations accept
responsibility for the effects of their actions on the environments of other nations. This
should serve as a guide to all subsequent national and international environmental actions.
See 26 U.N.Y.B. 319-21 (1972).
In support of United Nations involvement, United States Ambassador Arthur Gold-
berg stated:
[T]he crucial ingredient in the United Nations' capacity to keep the peace does
not lie in particular arrangements. The crucial ingredient is political and moral.
It is our determination to rely on the United Nations, to use the United Nations,
to have confidence in the United Nations' operating capacity. The stakes are so
high that we should be willing to take chances on the United Nations' capacity to
act, and to back it up even when some of its particular decisions go against our
immediate national desires. For the risks of a United Nations without the
capacity to act are far greater than the risk of a United Nations with that
capacity.
Let us put our faith in this Organization's ability to take on increasingly
difficult peacekeeping tasks around the globe. It will make mistakes. It will
annoy all of us some time, and some of us all the time. Despite these frustra-
tions, we should be willing to risk reliance on United Nations' peacekeeping,
because the alternative-of immobilizing the United Nations in one of its key
areas of activity-is too great a risk for us to take. It conjures up the specter of
uncontained disorder and violence which could escalate into a world holocaust
A. Cox, PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING 151 (1967).
56. The World Health Organization's active role in genetic manipulation research,
evidenced by the Advisory Committee on Medical Research, is based on written provi-
sions in the WHO Constitution. Article Twenty states that each member "undertakes that
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weighing the advantages and disadvantages of DNA investigations,
stated that WHO should "strongly support genetics studies involving
the artificial recombination of DNA."- 57 The Advisory Committee
drafted recommendations delineating its involvement in the area. Items
covered ranged from the establishment of a subcommittee to handle
safety problems in connection with manipulating microorganisms, to
designating WHO "collaboration centers" where scientists could meet
periodically to exchange views and assist the Advisory Committee in its
functions. 58
From the foregoing, it appears that WHO would be the most
appropriate international organization to sponsor the Convention since it
could exploit its prestige, strength and expertise to foster strict adher-
ence to international regulations in genetic research.5 9 Such an exten-
sion of the Asilomar message is necessary if research regulations are to
be effective and protect all nations, whether or not they are involved in
genetic manipulation research at the present time. To insure that the
standards contained in the Convention keep pace with the advance of
modern technology, they should be reviewed every year. This task
could be assigned to the WHO Advisory Committee on Medical
Research or a similar agency.
An excellent point of departure for specific international regula-
tions is found in the United States governmental agency guidelines,
it will, within eighteen months after adoption by the Health Association of a convention or
agreement, take action relating to its acceptance ...- Constitution of the World Health
Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14
U.N.T.S. 185, at Art. 2, para. 2(k). Although no convention has been adopted by the
Health Assembly, article Twenty provides the necessary machinery for this action. The
time is ripe to test its effectiveness. 0. SCHACHTER, M. NAWAZ & J. FRIED, TOWARD WIDER
ACCEPTANCE OF U.N. TREATIES 62 n.72 (1971).
57. O'Sullivan, WHO Seeks Role in Genetic Engineering, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEER-
ING NEWS, Aug. 11, 1975, at 19.
58. This suggestion was echoed at the Asilomar Conference. Paralleling national
efforts, the Conference recommended the establishment of an international body with a
four-fold purpose. This included: consulting with and advising national organizations on
the development and implementation of guidelines; encouraging the maintenance of
uniform research standards throughout the world; coordinating and reviewing the effi-
ciency and applicability of international guidelines; and, controlling any dissemination
into the environment of new recombinant types that are likely to produce significant
ecological effects. Recommendations, supra note 50.
59. Further, the World Health Organization possesses the machinery and personnel
resources necessary to undertake research development and control. In addition, unlike
independent organizations such as the International Red Cross, WHO enjoys the solid
foundation of the United Nations with its international prominence and credibility.
O'Sullivan, supra note 57.
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written by NIH, mentioned above.6 The rules specify combinations of
physical and biological barriers that researchers must erect around DNA
experiments. 61 Although all avenues of imaginative research that are
conceivable with genetic manipulation techniques cannot be antici-
pated, the NIH guidelines allow for largely unhampered experimenta-
tion, while advocating the considerable caution that is demanded by the
potential hazards. 62 These embryonic standards could be an invaluable
model for the Convention delegates when they prepare the international
regulations to be recognized by all nations.
63
The need for controls in genetic manipulation research has been
demonstrated and a proposal to satisfy this need has been suggested. A
pragmatic strategy for regulatory enforcement and containment of
dangerous microorganisms, as well as a mechanism for the resolution of
international claims, remain to be specified.
60. See text accompanying note 52, supra.
61. NIH guidelines, supra note 52.
62. Id. In addition to the concern shown by the NIH, the United States Senate has
kept abreast of the genetic manipulation problem. Senator Edward Kennedy, chairman of
the Senate Health Subcommittee, believes more government supervision of biological
research is required, and has suggested that "from a constitutional point of view, the
frontiers of law for the next . . . twenty-five years will be in these areas of bio-ethics."
NEWSWEEK, supra note 18, at 50.
In a speech given at the Harvard School of Public Health, Kennedy aired his thoughts
on NIH:
Public support, which implies confidence and trust, has become so substantial
that many of [the scientists] believe it is theirs by right. It is not. . . .The NIH
is no longer immune from responsible and penetrating inquiry by those who
underwrite its program-the American people.
121 CONG. REC. 8509 (daily ed. May 17, 1975).
For an excellent debate between scientists who support unlimited genetic manipula-
tion research and laymen who urge public input in regulating the research, see Hearings,
supra note 17, at 3 et seq.
63. However, one author finds the NIH guidelines lacking in several significant
areas. For example, the sole punishment for regulation violation is the mere withdrawal of
NIH funding. Moreover, legislation to completely prohibit experiments with extremely
hazardous recombinants is not propounded. Also, no specific precautions to reduce the
possibility of hybrid bacteria being stolen by criminals or deranged persons are presented.
Further, the NIH guidelines are mute as to the steps necessary to deter the grave
consequences of biological welfare. See DeNike, More Stringent Guidelines Are Vitally
Needed, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 29, 1976, part IV, at 5, col. 4. Additionally, Dr. Clifford
Grobstein, biology professor and Vice-Chancellor of University Relations at the Univer-
sity of California (San Diego), has commended the NIH guidelines by viewing them as a
first step in curbing dangerous DNA research, but warns that
[T]he guidelines themselves can hardly assure universal compliance nor can
they allay all anxiety. In terms of the particular issues they address, they are a
good beginning.
Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond the NIH Guidelines, 194 SCIENCE
1133 (1976).
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III. REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEFUL SETFLEMENT
OF GENETIC MANIPULATION DAMAGE CLAIMS
A. Enforcement and Containment
The ultimate fear of genetic manipulation research scientists arises
from their inability to predict the damage that can be inflicted by an
escaped germ. Since the properties of novel recombinant molecules are
not known, a plethora of reactions is possible if a synthetic germ is
unleashed in the environment. Should escape threaten, the most expe-
ditious means of determining and implementing containment proce-
dures must be employed, lest irreversible harm result. 64 To allay this
fear and encourage safe research, a mechanism must exist that will
quickly and efficiently move to prevent damage stemming from mis-
guided or careless experimentation.
Effective research regulation and accident prevention is premised
on adherence to technical rules. Given the high degree of danger
accompanying any threatened or actual breach of such regulations, it is
imperative that some impartial body stand available on the shortest
possible notice to settle any question of breach, and to guarantee
containment by enforcing adherence to international regulations. This
function should be assigned to a "board of inquiry." 65 This body would
be responsible for fact-finding and investigation. 66 The inquiry proce-
dure is recognized as a widely applicable method of resolving controver-
sies and may be used alone or in conjunction with arbitration, concilia-
tion or mediation.
67
64. It is a sad fact that, throughout history, mankind has only managed to forge
new instruments of international order after going through crises and wars.
Thus, before forming the League of Nations, the First World War was fought;
before forming the United Nations, the Second World War was waged. It is high
time that we learned to make progress before a crisis becomes acute, before
hostilities actually break out, and before catastrophe threatens.
L. KUTAKOV, THE DECLARATIONONTHE STRENGTHENINGOF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 16,
U.N. Doc. OPI/446-12496 (1971).
65. Inquiry has gained prominence in recent years even though it is recognized as a
traditional method of dispute settlement. Efforts to promote this peace-keeping device
have consistently been advanced by the United Nations. For example, U.N. Military
Observer Groups in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) were established by the United
Nations Security Council in 1948, with the dual task of investigating the fighting in
Kashmir and mediating between India and Pakistan. UNMOGIP's duties also included
discrete observations of the ceasefire line, along with the "competence to decide whether
or not there is a violation of the Cease-Fire Agreement by either side." N. BAR-YAACOV,
THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF INQUIRY 251 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as BAR-YAACOV], reviewed, Coleman, Book Review, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 429
(1976). Similar U.N. inquiry mechanisms have been utilized in the Middle East conflict
and in investigations centering on violations of human rights in Southern Africa. SeeU.N.
Doc. A/5746 at 91, 171-84 (1964).
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Since the core of the inquiry procedure is objective fact determina-
tion, its application in specific, technical spheres such as genetic
manipulation would be extremely suitable. The utility of this procedure
need not depend on the existence of a formal controversy, 68 but may be
employed as a matter of routine practice for the purpose of preventing,
rather than settling disputes. 69 To promote impartiality, the Board's
members might be chosen by WHO and consist of both scientists and
laymen.
Procedurally, if a signatory to the Convention believed its safety
jeopardized by another nation's research activities, the threatened
nation would appeal to the Board of Inquiry for a factual determination
of the matter at issue. The Board certainly should have the power to
suggest alternative regulatory measures amenable to both nations.
Further, in order to achieve its primary goal of being able to respond
quickly enough to forclose the possibility of irreversible genetic devas-
tation, the Board should also have injunctive powers to prohibit any
activity which the Board determined to be dangerous.7o
This proposal has numerous benefits. First, since several of the
persons on the Board would be experts in the field of genetic manipula-
tion, they would be able to offer, on a continuing basis, their assistance
in reviewing research regulations and distributing information about
the latest developments, precautionary measures, and possible antidotes
for undesirable reactions, to geneticists around the globe. The Board
members' efforts in maintaining free communication among the world
community of genetic scientists would likely be just as instrumental in
promoting research safety as their efforts in enforcement of the interna-
tional regulations. Second, the Board would be a stable and objective
element in an area where international technological competition can
run high. This is assured through the use of a neutral organization not
motivated solely by political or nationalistic considerations. 7 1 Third,
members of the Board would be available immediately to assist with the
68. Id. at 12.
69. This recommendation is imperative for studies connected with genetic manipula-
tion. Since this research area holds countless unknowns, the avenues of possible dissemi-
nation and infiltration of a deadly germ are virtually infinite. Routine "spot-checks" of
research facilities can supply the minimal preventive requirements needed to assure
compliance with international regulations and uncover potential microorganism escape
routes.
70. Enforcement of international regulations is always difficult. The injunctive
powers conferred by the Convention on the Board of Inquiry might be exercised best by
requiring that the culpable government enjoin the research activity of its scientists at the
request of the Board.
71. P. JESSUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 59 (1971).
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containment process. Since the consequences of a malfunctioning
genetic manipulation experiment could result in a chain reaction with
the potential for extreme danger in a short period of time, it is mandatory
that implementation of containment measures proceed quickly and
effectively.
B. Dispute Settlement
The Board of Inquiry is addressed to the containment of dangerous
microorganisms. If its attempts should be unsuccessful, however, and a
deadly germ escapes with ensuing damage to surrounding nations,
arbitration is proposed as the best method for settlement of the resulting
disputes .72
Arbitration is defined as a process whereby parties voluntarily refer
their disputes to an impartial tribunal, comprised of an odd number of
persons selected by them, for an efficient and economical decision
based on the evidence and arguments presented to the tribunal .73 This
definition is purposely broad since the procedure is flexible and easily
adaptable to a wide range of different dispute situations.
74
Traditionally, every country involved in a dispute selects at least
one representative to an arbitral tribunal, with a neutral member chosen
by mutual agreement. However, since the extent of damage caused by
an escaping microorganism may involve many nations within a very
short time span, this arrangement is neither practical nor efficient, and
must be modified for disputes arising under the genetic manipulation
research Convention. A standing panel of arbitrators would be neces-
sary in this unique situation. Such a panel could be selected by WHO
either for a fixed term or on a revolving membership basis. The details of
72. Arbitration has been used repeatedly to supplement inquiry. In fact, the institu-
tion of international inquiry came into focus after 1907, when then United States President
Taft negotiated arbitration treaties with France and Great Britain. Signed in August, 1911,
the texts provided that all differences or controversies between the parties must be
submitted either to an arbitral tribunal or to a Joint High Commission of Inquiry. See
further BAR-YAACOV, supra note 65, at 113.
73. M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1968).
74. In the past, lawyers have sought to provide for the settling of disputes by
peaceful means. But of late, "we have been marking time while watching our scientific
brethren at work in their laboratories seeking the means not only to destroy armies but to
destroy the human race." This observation was made at a recent conference in support of
a United Nations resolution authorizing the settlement of international disputes by
arbitration. It was stated that arbitration is preferable to other methods of settling disputes
because it is a flexible process and completely under the control of the parties. It is also
easily adapted to a great variety of problems. Henry, A Plea for Compulsory Arbitration of
International Disputes, 54 ABA J. 1187, 1189 (1968).
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the selection process should be left to WHO and subsequently incorpo-
rated into the Convention.
75
Flexibility and efficiency, characteristic of the arbitration process,
make arbitration especially appropriate for dealing with the great
diversity of both factual and legal circumstances likely to be encoun-
tered in the unique field of genetic manipulation accidents.76 These
characteristics should be kept in mind when examining the liability that
the Tribunal will impose on the nation responsible for damages. Since
the scope of remedial measures is as vast as the variety of accidents that
can result from genetic research, and limited only by the arbitrators'
imagination and reason, a discussion of liability must, of necessity, be
general and nonspecific. Therefore, a suggested approach that the
Tribunal may use in determining liability is presented, but should not be
relied upon to the exclusion of other remedial devices.
C. Legal Liability
Legal liability for damage resulting from genetic manipulation
research cannot be dealt with definitively because of the scant under-
standing of the effect which an escaped microorganism used in such an
75. One of the most effective ways to proceed with arbitration is provided by the
Model Rules of Arbitral Procedure. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 83; U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/113 (1958). This United Nations guide, authored by the International law Com-
mission, is a set of model articles upon which governments might draw in drafting
arbitration treaties. It is based on the concept that an agreement to arbitrate involves an
international obligation equivalent to a treaty obligation. Having once entered into it,
nations are legally bound to abide by it and to take all steps necessary to enable the
arbitration to occur so that the dispute can be settled. WHO might make its task of
sponsoring the Convention simpler by using sections of the Model Rules. For example,
article Three, paragraph two states that the arbitral tribunal must be formed within three
months from the date of the request to submit the dispute to arbitration. If this provision is
not met, the President of the International Court of Justice will appoint the undesignated
arbitrators. Such a provision is essential to prevent procrastination and lingering disputes.
76. Although the resolution of a genetic manipulation dispute would benefit by a
speedy arbitral decision, Seitz warns of the dangers involved in such a process:
[O]n occasion, a final decision is urgently needed even more than a scintillating
exposition of the reasoning which supports the conclusions announced. ...
[Slome decisions are unduly delayed in their issuance, due to overcommitment
by the arbitrator or to genetic and habitual procrastination. The arbitrator
should be informed of the problems. . . . Pressures of time . . . can vitally
affect, disadvantageously, the quality of the arbitrator's product. . . . Flexi-
bility in procedure . . . has been the breadth, blood and sinew . . . of...
arbitration. Orthodox adherence to rules . . . laid down by [non-arbitrators],
without regard to the exigencies of particular cases. . . can result in quick but
bad and unsatisfactory arbitration ....... Festina lente"-"make haste
slowly."
Seitz, Thoughts on Instant Arbitration, 30 ARB. J. 124, 125-28 (1975).
Of course, if the parties prefer, arbitration does not have to be the method of dispute
settlement. For example, when minor disputes arise, diplomacy, negotiation or concilia-
tion may be more appropriate without requiring the formal machinery of arbitration.
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experiment might have on the environment. 77 However, it is at least
possible to decrease the inevitable conflict of law problems that will
arise, by requiring that part of the Convention be an agreement identify-
ing the law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal in resolving damage
claims.78
The modern trend in scientific advances, such as space exploration
and weather modification, is to base fault on a theory of strict liability. 79
Under this tort concept, a defendant is held liable for damage resulting
from any "ultrahazardous activity." 8 This includes action which
involves "a risk of serious harm" to the person or property of others,
that "cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care. ' 81
Genetic manipulation experiments resulting in the escape of a dangerous
organism clearly are included in this definition. Despite the most
stringent regulations and "utmost care" exercised by scientists, the
constant risk of an escaping recombinant germ is an inherent danger.
Further, since the effects of such an escape are unpredictable, the risk is
heightened by the likelihood that any antidote will probably be unavail-
able, or worse, unknown. 82 Therefore, the application of strict liability
to genetic manipulation research appears to be a natural step in this
continually expanding area of international tort law. 83 For example, the
77. This thought was originally applied to outer space activities but is equally
applicable to genetic manipulation experimentation, or, for that matter, any new venture
in which man engages. Also, another factor contributing to the liability problem's being
unresolved is the absence of any international treaty or convention addressing this issue. It
is to this problem that the present section of this comment is devoted. See Dow, Legal
Liability Resulting From Space Activities, I CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1970).
78. S. LAY AND H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN
SPACE 160 (1970).
79. See generally Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 507 (1967); Taubenfeld, Weather Modification and Control: Some International
Legal Implications, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 493 (1967); Note, Weather Modification: A Modest
Proposal, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 159 (1974); E. SCHWARTZ, OVERSKILL: THE DECLINE
OF TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN CIVILIZATION 211 (1971); Comment, Weather Genesis and
Weather Neutralization: A New Approach to Weather Modification, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L
L.J. 412 (1976).
80. Activities to which the term applies in municipal common law include: water
collected in quantity in a dangerous place, explosives, flammable liquids stored in a large
city, blasting, crop dusting, factories emitting smoke, gas, or other noxious fumes in a
community, and the fumigation of a building with dangerous chemicals. For a complete
discussion, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 508-16 (4th ed. 1971).
81. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
82. See note 20, supra and accompanying text.
83. Strict liability began as a theory for protecting plaintiffs from dangerous animals.
This principle was extended in the landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868, L.R. 3 H.L.
330. Defendants built a reservoir on their land which ruptured and flooded plaintiff's land.
Even though the traditional principles of trespass and nuisance were absent, the plaintiff
Vol. 7
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United Nations has recommended absolute liability for space activities,
as adopted in article VII of the Treaty on Principles Governing Activities
of States in Outer Space. 84 Signed by more than sixty countries, the
relevant language provides that a state is internationally liable for
damage to another state resulting from objects launched into space. 
85
The strict liability principle runs throughout the range of interna-
tional relationships. 86 In the well known Trail Smelter Arbitration case
was allowed to recover on an "absolute" nuisance theory based upon the analogy of strict
liability for trespassing cattle and dangerous animals. W. PROSSER, supra note 81, at
505-06.
Today, the concept has been broadened in American courts to apply to damage
created by testing supersonic aircraft. In Berg v. Reaction Motors Div. Thiokol Chemical
Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962), the court stated that although careful blasting did
not involve an unreasonable risk of harm, it was, nonetheless, an ultrahazardous activity
"which introduces an unusual danger into the community and should pay its own way in
the event it actually causes damage to others." Id. at 494.
84. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347
(1967).
85. Id. at article VII. Although not precisely on point, this provision of the space
treaty lends credibility to a strict liability proposal in genetic manipulation research.
However, it must be remembered that the effect of an object launched from outer space is
not nearly as catastrophic as the effects of an escaped germ. With three-quarters of the
earth's surface being water, and the vast majority of the land mass standing vacant of
humankind, the chance of escaped space debris damaging a populated corner of the world
is small as compared to the probable danger presented by a pervasive, self-reproducing
germ swimming through international waters or aloft in universal air. For these vital
reasons, strict liability, as a remedial theory, is crucial for control of genetic manipulation
research.
86. Goldie suggests a general trend in all areas of international law toward the
principle of absolute liability and notes:
Absolute liability has been imposed in four recent international agreements on
liability to third parties in the field of nuclear energy. These agreements
incorporate the concept of "channelling," which traces liability back to the
nuclear operator, no matter how long the chain of causation, nor how novel the
intervening factors ...
Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1189, 1216(1965). This view is supported by the fact that international
tribunals have had no difficulty in assessing damages according to international law. See
M. WHITEMAN'S three volumes of DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1937-43).
Examples of differing views on damage assessment in international law are found in
several national drafts for an international space treaty. The Belgian government believes
that compensation should be assessed under the national law of the person injured. France
supports the lex loci theory, applying the law of the place of the wrong where damage was
caused. The Hungarian thought on damage is based on loss of profits, using the law of the
state liable for damage. In the United States view, compensation should be determined in
accordance with applicable principles of international law, justice and equity. It is
believed by most authorities that the United States provision is superior as it allows the
widest latitude and flexibility for international claims. Cheng, Liability for Spacecraft, 23
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 217 (1970).
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between the United States and Canada, Canada was held responsible for
injury and damage in the United States resulting from fumes and
"fallout" emitted from a British Columbia smelter, and deposited over
a large area of the state of Washington.87 The arbitral tribunal
concluded:
[U]nder the principles of international law, .. no State has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.8"
Canada was obliged, therefore, to pay damages on the theory that a
nation incurs liability under international law if it permits or fails to act
reasonably to prevent conduct within its territory which causes injury in
the territory of another nation.
89
The question of whether strict liability will apply to the use of the
latest scientific achivements, such as nuclear energy and genetic
87. Trail Smelter Arbitration, (United States v. Canada, 1941), 3 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905 (1949), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
In the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT SECOND OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), the only precedent cited on the topic of a nation's
liability to another in connection with pollution is the Trail Smelter Arbitration, id. at 18,
n.3.
The relation of cause to effect underlies the parallel principle that a state may be
held responsible under international law for damage which it causes in the
territory of another state. Thus Canada was held responsible to the United
States under international law for the production of fumes in Canada which
polluted the air in the United States.
Id.
88. Trail Smelter Arbitration, (United States v. Canada, 1941), 3 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905, 1965 (1949), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941).
89. According to the Trail Smelter decision, there must be actual, provable, substan-
tial physical damage to a traditional interest. In other words, tangible damage must exist;
violations of sovereignty are not enough. This decision appears counter to present notions
of autonomous sovereignty:
On the one hand, we have a world in which the independence and the
sovereignty of states are not only a fact which must be taken into account but
also an undoubtedly positive and progressive safeguard of their free interna-
tional development and autonomous role in international life. On the other
hand, we have the obvious process whereby conditions for increasingly close
links in the world are being created and require adequate economic and political
forms. . . . In such a world the only possible solution is the application of the
principles of peaceful co-existence.
Contained in a speech delivered by J.B. Tito, at the Univ. of Rangoon, Jan. 16, 1955, in D.
Nifclc, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 333 (1970).
Based on the above principles, it has been suggested that the Trail Smelter decision be
withdrawn and replaced by the principle of general international law that pollution of a
neighbor's territory constitutes a clear violation of an international obligation. SeeRubin,
Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 ORE. L. REV. 259 (1971).
Vol. 7
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manipulation, has not been tested. 90 However, from the above discus-
sion, it seems probable that strict liability would be the best avenue for
the arbitrators to use in assessing responsibility for damage caused by an
escaped germ. The application of a theory of liability without fault
would eliminate the extremely difficult, if not impossible, task of
determining questions of negligence and due care.
91
Computation of damages should be determined by the Tribunal
after liability has been established. 92 Because there is a risk that any
particular damage rules based on existing technological information
may become outmoded, detailed explanations of damage evaluation
would be left to the arbitrators' discretion.
93
If it is thought that the remedy of strict liability is too stringent in
this uncharted area, states must consider that, for the moment, it is better
to err on the side of safety, and set remedial measures for genetic
experiments higher than those which the experiments may eventually
warrant. Therefore, when a country accedes to the Convention,
although its sovereignty may be compromised, 94 it would enjoy the
90. When this tort concept is before the courts, "it may be predicted with a good deal
of confidence that this is an area in which no court will. . . refuse to recognize and apply
the principle of strict liability ...... W. PROSSER, supra note 81, at 516.
91. Additional reasons for working within a strict liability framework are suggested
by the unique dangers of space exploration. For example, since damage from reentry of a
spacecraft violates the sovereignty of the adjacent state, proof of a lack of due care should
be irrelevant, and strict liability should attach. Further, standards of care to assess fault in
space activities have not been developed. For additional reasons for strict liability in space
activities, see S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 78, at 170.
This same reasoning can be applied to genetic manipulation experiments. When a
dangerous germ enters the territory of a neighboring state, sovereignty is compromised.
Also, since international regulations have not yet been adopted, standards of care to
determine negligence are absent. Therefore, strict liability is as applicable to germ
research as it is to space research, if the reasoning of.the above authors is accepted.
"Nations have apparently been willing to accept concepts of strict liability, in effect
making themselves insurers, in certain new technological fields such as outer space
activities." Taubenfeld, supra note 79, at 499. They might well do the same for genetic
manipulation to speed the process of experimentation. "This would certainly ease the
burden on claimants of establishing liability; but absent an international agreement
covering the matter, the claimants' task [remains] difficult at best." Id.
92. This theory has been applied in international space law as provided in the Treaty
on Principles, supra note. 84.
93. Since technology advances so rapidly, any attempt to establish a set remedial
procedure for international practice becomes fruitless. The arbitrators would, therefore,
use the existing state of the art and international law when a dispute arises.
94. A nation might also assent to the convention, yet avoid being bound, by adopting
an express reservation.
A true reservation which becomes a part of a treaty is one which alters "the
effect of the treaty in so far as it may apply in the relations of [the] State with the
other State or States which may be parties to the treaty."
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security of knowing that all other signatories will be encouraged to
follow the regulations at the risk of being subject to strict liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The international regulation of genetic manipulation is a necessity
because of the high risk of damage to the biosphere. Although this
research has "passed from an era of undisciplined speculation into one
of rational inquiry, scientists still are unable to assess the possibilities
and limitations" of large scale experimentation. 95 To continue unregu-
lated experiments would be to transform the earth into a "laboratory in
vivo" 96 where man would interfere with nature's balance without
assurance that he could survive the effects.
For these life-sustaining reasons, this comment has proposed a
Convention containing international regulations for genetic manipula-
tion experiments to reduce the possibility of a germ escaping from a
laboratory with resultant injury to people and the environment. Adher-
ence to regulations and any threats of escape are to be handled by a
Board of Inquiry. However, if a germ should escape, the Convention
would also provide immediate remedies through the use of an arbitral
tribunal that would assess responsibility within a framework of strict
liability. It is believed that this procedure would be the most effective
way to settle genetic manipulation disputes when they arise, and it is
hoped that all nations would adopt such a proposal.
It is the paradox of our times that the very progress achieved
by man in the technological and social fields originally
intended to improve his way of living, now poses challenges to
present and future generations. 97
Report of the Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 843, 857
(1935) in 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 778 (1964).
In the United States, the Senate, pursuant to its treaty powers, can place a condition
upon its approval of an international document by including in its resolution of advice and
consent a reservation, understanding, or other declaration, usually prefaced by the
following wording:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the
Senate advise and consent to the ratification of. subject to the following
(reservation) ...
14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (1970).
95. Note, WeatherModification: A Modest Proposal, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 159,
161 (1974). This observation, originally applied to weather modification, is equally true for
genetic manipulation.
96. See generally E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 79, at 211.
97. Statement by Manlio Brosio, fourth Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, in HUNTLY, supra note 3, at 11.
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The Genetic Manipulation Research Convention will lessen the hiatus
between science and law, and serve as a guiding precedent for the




Izenstark: Genetic Manipulation: Research Regulation and Legal Liability Und
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
